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THE BATTLE FOR INTERNATIONAL BANK
ACCOUNTS: RESTRICTIONS ON
INTERNATIONAL PAYMENTS FOR
POLITICAL ENDS AND ARTICLE VIII
OF THE FUND AGREEMENT
CYNTHIA C. LICHTENSTEIN*
In recent years, governments have increasingly utilized
controls on international payments to gain political leverage
over other countries. This is often accomplished by blocking
the bank accounts of the target countries. I While the aims of
governments imposing such controls are often the same as in
the case of controls imposed for political reasons on the in-
ternational movement of goods, a different international
legal regime applies to interferences with international pay-
ments.2 The treaty establishing the latter regime, the Inter-
national Monetary Fund Agreement,3 provides for a compre-
* Professor of Law, Boston College Law School.
1. See Logan & Lichtenstein, Political Dams Across Fiancial Flows, in
SOUTHWESTERN LEGAL FOUNDATION, PRIVATE INVESTORS AiROAD: 2
PROBLEMS AND SOLUTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS Ch. 13 (Matthew
Bender 1986) (discussing sanctions on payment flows).
2. To the extent that any nation's goods are treated in a discrimina-
tory manner by an importing country's government, obligations under the
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (hereinafter GATT) may be im-
plicated. See e.g., A. LOWENFELD, INTERNATIONAL MONETARY SYSTEMS 136-
39 (2d ed. 1984) (discussing the import surcharge imposed by the Nixon
Administration in 1971). The GATT, however, contains an exception to
obligations incurred under it for restrictions on imports imposed ror se-
curity reasons. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade. Oct. 30. 1947,
61 Stat. (5), (6), T.I.A.S. No. 1700, 55-61 U.N.T.S., art. XXI. However.
unlike the Fund Agreement, see inf a note 3. the GATT does not provide
for a central international organization with the authority to examine rc-
strictions for their conformity to the regime established. As for controls
over exports, the much more frequent form of sanctions. international la w
does not generally address a nation's utilization of this form of pressure
upon another nation. J. JACKSON, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELTiOS
§ 5.6 (1986).
3. Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund. Decemi-
ber 27, 1945, 60 Stat. 1401, T.I.A.S. No. 1501, 2 U.N.T.S. 39. amendrdlbr
20 U.S.T. 2775, T.I.A.S. No. 6748, 726 U.N.T.S. 266. 29 U.S.T. 2203.
T.I.A.S. No. 8937 [hereinafter Fund Agreement]. The history of the Fund
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hensive system of elimination of restrictions on payments for
trade and services. However, the exception to the scheme
for payment blockages for security reasons that has been cre-
ated by the supervising international body, the International
Monetary Fund (hereinafter IMF)4 operates in practice to
foster politically motivated restrictions. This Article exam-
ines the history of the IMF's involvement in such sanctions
and suggests a way for the IMF to limit its role in the appre-
ciation of their legality.
The period prior to World War II saw competitive de-
valuations of national currencies and the proliferation of ex-
change controls devastating to the international trading sys-
tem. At the end of the War, states not only attempted to
provide a comprehensive peace keeping regime through the
United Nations, they also constructed at Bretton Woods in
the Fund Agreement a comprehensive "code of conduct" for
international monetary relations. One of the key purposes of
this "code" was to eliminate restrictions on payments for
current transactions in order to ensure that the desired re-
birth and growth in international trade would not be im-
peded by the transaction costs of exchange control systems.
In particular, article VIII, section 2 of the Fund Agreement
states that "... no member shall, without approval of the
Fund, impose restrictions on the making of payments and
transfers for current international transactions." 5
This provision, however, is not absolute. The drafters
of The Fund Agreement recognized that some countries
would be at stages in their economic development that might
prevent them from immediately complying with article VIII,
section 2. Accordingly, they included article XIV, which pro-
vides a transitional regime for those countries initially un-
Agreement, the treaty embodying the nations' desire to restructure the
international monetary system, will not be dealt with in this Article.
4. For a brief history of the founding of the IMF, see R. EDWARDS.
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY COLLABORATIONS ch. 1 (1985). Professor Ed-
wards' recent book sets out an extraordinarily detailed and useful exami-
nation of the international monetary system, the relevant international or-
gans, and the jurisprudence of the Fund. This Article draws heavily on
Professor Edwards' chapter entitled "Exchange Controls," id. ch. 10, and.
in particular, on the section entitled "National Security Restrictions." /d.
at 415-20.
5. Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII, § 2(a).
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able to tolerate an economic system without exchange con-
trols. Countries that are unable to allow free convertibility
of their currency may temporarily maintain or "adapt to
changing circumstances" those restrictions in effect at the
time they became members of the Fund.6 However, article
XIV countries must obtain Fund approval for restrictions im-
posed after their entry into the Fund Agreement, if these re-
strictions are not adaptations as described above. Thus, arti-
cle XIV countries may need Fund approval for restrictions
imposed for political reasons.
Under the Article VIII "code of conduct," countries may
control "capital transactions," but they have promised not to
restrict payments for "current transactions" without Fund
approval. 7 Unless a member 8 receives Fund approval for the
restriction, a restriction placed on a bank account that pre-
vents the use of that bank account for making payments or
transfers for current international transactions constitutes a
violation of article VIII, section 2(a). Thus, if a member na-
tion imposes restrictions that are subject to article VIII, sec-
tion 29 on the bank accounts of a target country or its nation-
6. Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. XIV. Article XIV provides that
members who avail themselves of the privilege of exchange restrictions
during the transitional period "shall, however, have continuous regard in
their foreign exchange policies to the purposes of die Fund, and, as soon
as conditions permit, they shall take all possible measures to develop such
commercial and financial arrangements with other members as will facili-
tate international payments and the promotion of a stable system of ex-
change rates." Id. § 2. This provision demonstrates the purpose of the
Fund Agreement to abolish exchange controls on payments for current
transactions.
7. For a discussion of the elaborately articulated distinction between
capital and current transactions, see 3 J. GOLD, TIE FUND AGREE.%tEXr 1.
THE COURTS 538-42 (1986); see also RESTATEMENT OF FOREIGN RELATIONS
LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (REVISED) § 82 1, 1 (v), at 601 (Tent. Draft No.
6, 1985) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT (REVISED)]; R. EDWARDS, sUPra note 4.
at 394-96. It may assumed that demand deposit accounts at commercial
banks are used to make payments and transfers for current international
transactions. Thus, blocking orders covering such accounts implicate arti-
cle VIII, section 2.
8. At present, most countries are members of the Fund. so the re-
quirement is nearly universal.
9. To be subject to article VIII, section 2 the restriction must be im-
posed after the date of the member's entry into the Fund if the coumtry is
following the Article XIV regime.
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als without receiving Fund approval, the sanctioning nation
violates one of its international legal obligations.
Violations of this particular norm of international eco-
nomic law are of interest to private economic actors because
the Fund Agreement in one provision has application to pri-
vate transactions, that is, to contracts. As noted above,' 0 the
drafters of the treaty recognized the impossibility for every
country at all times to abolish exchange controls entirely.
Article XIV countries, for example, would need to maintain
their exchange controls until they reached a stage of devel-
opment able to sustain free convertibility. Any country
might need to temporarily impose restrictions on payments
in the case of a temporary setback to the equilibrium of its
balance of payments." l If a country imposes exchange con-
trols for reasons consistent with the Fund Agreement, the
treaty provides that other members, through their courts or
administrative authorities, must not enforce private "ex-
change contracts" that violate these controls.' 2 This obliga-
tion on other members, and their courts, is contained in the
first sentence of article VIII, section 2(b), which reads: "Ex-
change contracts which involve the currency of any member
and which are contrary to the exchange control regulations
of that member maintained or imposed consistently with this
Agreement shall be unenforceable in the territories of any
member."13
If a private contract arguably falls within the definition
of "exchange contracts" in article VIII, section 2(b),' " a
10. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
11. Even the United States, lynchpin of the international monetary sys-
tem until 1971, found it necessary in August, 1971 to refuse to honor its
commitment to the convertibility of official balances of dollars into gold.
For the story of the United States' fall from grace and its efforts to stop its
loss of gold, see A. LOWENFELD, sUpM note 2 at 113-43.
12. Other members must ensure that such contracts "[do] not receive
the assistance of the judicial or administrative authorities of [such] nmm-
bers in obtaining the performance of such contracts." E.B. Decision No.
446-4 (June 10, 1949).
13. Fund Agreement, supra note 3, art. VIII, § 2(b).
14. The scope of the term "exchange contract" has been extensively
debated; the arguments will not be repeated here. See, e.g., 2 J. GoD,
supra note 7, at 92, 425; R. EDWARDS. supra note 4, at 484-89. See also lie
discussion of the RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 7, § 822. comment h.
at 605.
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court of a Fund member is required to give effect to the ex-
change controls of another member by refusing to enforce
the contract violating the controls, providing all conditions
of the provision are met.' 5 The rule is a mandatory one, be-
cause each member state has promised not to enforce such
contracts.1 6 A court of a member state is bound by intema-
tional law to carry out its state's treaty obligations.
A blocking order imposed on commercial bank accounts
for political or strategic reasons falls within the meaning of
the term "exchange control regulations." According tojudi-
cial decisions, this term encompasses all restrictions on "the
making of payments and transfers for current international
transactions," as well as "monetary controls imposed on cap-
ital movements." 1 7 Thus, article VIII, section 2(b) applies if
the contract creating the deposit account is an exchange con-
tract, and the blocking order is "imposed consistently with
this Agreement."t 8 A blocking order that restricts payments
for current transactions out of a country's or its nationals'
bank accounts must have prior Fund approval or it will not
be consistent (because of the article VIII, section 2(a) obliga-
tion) with the Agreement.' 9
15. See RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 7, § 822 (restating the rule
and Comment). This rule reverses the former "revenue rule" of private
international law under which the forum refused to recognize and give
effect to fiscal measures, including exchange control regulations, of states
other than the forum state.
As professor Edwards explains, when an exchange contract has its "si-
tus" in the forum state and both the contract and a conflicting foreign
exchange control regulation of another state meet the Fund Agreement
criteria, this rule results in giving extraterritorial effect to a foreign ex-
change control regulation. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4. at 483.
16. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 478 n.463.
17. See id. at 480-8 1. According to Edwards, judicial decisions support
the view that the form, and not the purpose, of the measures determines
whether they are exchange control regulations within the meaning of sec-
tion 2(b). Id.
18. Id. at 481. "Member states of the International Monetary Fund
may not enforce exchange controls involving the currency of another
member state if such controls are contrary to that state's exchange control
regulations maintained or imposed consistently with the Articles of Agree-
ment of the Fund." RESTATEMENT (REVISED), supra note 7, § 822.
19. Letter from George P. Nicoletopoulos, then Director of the IMF
Legal Department, to the Author (March 2, 1981) (on file with the Au-
thor).
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This results in important consequences for a bank hold-
ing any deposit account of the country being sanctioned. If a
sanctioning country has received Fund approval for the ex-
change restrictions of the blocking order, and the deposit ac-
count is an "exchange contract," 20 the bank can refuse to
repay the deposit in accordance with the blocking order. If
the depositor, usually the target country, brings suit, the
bank can rely on the court's duty under the treaty not to en-
force the deposit contract. Commercial banks raised this de-
fense in French and British courts following the Fund's ap-
proval of the currency restrictions that the United States im-
posed on Iran during the hostage crisis. 2 1
Recently, the United States imposed economic sanctions
against Libya in response to its alleged terrorist activity.22
The Libyan sanctions contain a blocking order extending to
all Libyan Government dollar deposits in foreign branches of
U.S. banks. 23 This blocking order caught $131 million in de-
posits of the Libyan Arab Foreign Bank, an instrumentality
of the Libyan Government, with the Bankers Trust Com-
pany's London branch. The Libyan Arab Foreign Bank de-
manded payment of its deposit. Bankers Trust, caught be-
tween the depositor and its own government's sanctions, re-
fused payment and quickly became involved in litigation in
London.24 Although this litigation was recently concluded
20. For a definition of "exchange contract," see RESTATEMENT (RE-
VISED), supra note 7, § 822. For a civil law country view, see Trib. Grande
Inst. de Paris, 9e ch., 12 mars 1985 (Deine Deng Thi To Tern et autres c.
Banque Frangaise Commerciale).
21. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 418. Iranian Government entities held
large Eurodollar deposits with branches of U.S. banks in London and
Paris. The U.S. sanctions, 44 Fed. Reg. 65,956 (1979) (codified in 31
C.F.R. pt. 535), purported to cover dollar deposits booked at branches of
U.S. banks abroad. The Iranian entities brought suit for payment of their
deposits. Before the French or U.K. courts handed down decisions, the
Iranian Accords made the issues moot. See also W. CHRISTOPIIER, ANiMuI-
CAN HOSTAGES IN IRAN: TiIE CONUcr Ov A CRISIS (1985).
For a complete history of the Iranian sanctions, see Malloy. The Iran
Crisis: Lau, Under Pressure, 1984 Wis. INT'l. I.J. 15. For a contemporary
commentary, see Gordon & Lichtenstein. The Derision to Block hmnian ,ssIs
Reexamined, 16 INT'L LAW. 161 (1982).
22. Exec. Order No. 12,544. 3 C.F.R. 182 (1986).
23. 31 C.F.R. § 550.516 (1986).
24. Libyan Arab Foreign Bank v. Bankers Trust Co., 1986 L. No. 1567
(Q.B. 1986) (lower court opinion). This litigation is fully described in an-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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without consideration of the effect of article VIII on the de-
posit accounts caught by the blocking order, if the Libyan
blocking order had been approved by the Fund,25 and Bank-
ers Trust had chosen to characterize the deposit contract as
an exchange contract, 26 Bankers Trust could have argued
that article VIII, section 2(b) required the British court to
recognize the U.S. blocking order, regardless of the United
Kingdom's view of so participating in sanctions against
Libya.
But why should the Fund approve a restriction imposed
on the bank accounts of a member nation for reasons having
nothing to do with the United States' balance of payments or
protection of its reserves? The purpose of article VIII is to
strengthen the international trading system by encouraging
freedom of payments for current transactions, according to
other article in this Symposium issue. See Weisburg, Unilateral Economic
Sanctions and the Risks of Extratenitorial Application: The Libyan E&ample, 19
N.Y.U.J. INT'L L. & POL. 993 (1987) (elsewhere this issue).
25. The deposit account at issue in the case did not function as a means
of payment for Libya's current transactions after 1980, but instead func-
tioned as a "reservoir" to maintain a positive balance in plaintiff's corre-
spondent account with Bankers Trust in New York. Libyan Arab Foreign
Bank, 1986 L. No. 1567, slip op. at 8 (opinion of Lord Kerr). The U.S.
blocking order, as applied to this account, could be characterized as a re-
striction on capital transactions that does not require approval of the
Fund. However, the motivation for the imposition of the Libyan sanctions
was neither to protect the reserve position of the United States nor to
prevent capital flight; it was strictly a political or strategic sanction against
Libya. Thus, the Libyan case is not an appropriate one for the application
of article VIII, section 2(b), regardless of the nature (capital or current) of
the account purportedly blocked by the sanctions.
26. This raises the question of whether the court should have raised
the issue of article VIII, section 2(b) itself, given that the parties did not
raise it. Article VIII is "public law" as a provision of a treaty to which the
United Kingdom is a party and has such effect on the municipal law as the
law of the forum gives it. The U.K. courts, however, view the meaning or
"exchange contracts" narrowly, as did the U.S. court in Libra Bank L.td. v.
Banco National de Costa Rica S.A, 570 F. Supp. 870 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
which refused to apply article VIII, section 2(b) to a case involving tie
Costa Rican Government's restriction on repayment to U.S. lending banks
of loans to Costa Rican entities on the ground that dollar loans fri'o fn-
cign banks are not "exchange contracts." It is thus not surprising that
neither the court in the Libyan case, Bankers Trust. nor the U..S. Gtwvcnu-
ment raised the issue of article VIII, section 2(b). But see infu texta cconl-
panying notes 36-38.
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each member's particular economic circumstances.2 7 Pre-
sumably, the Fund uses the need of a member seeking to im-
pose a restriction to protect its balance of payments and the
role that the restriction is to play in the member's effort to
return to equilibrium as the criteria for approving a restric-
tion. The obligation of other members to help the troubled
member through enforcing that member's exchange controls
should only be triggered by restrictions that are consistent
with the Fund Agreement.
The Fund faces a dilemma. Article VIII, section 2(a)
does not distinguish among restrictions on current transac-
tions imposed for economic reasons and those imposed to
pressure a target government. The Fund wants members to
comply with article VIII by imposing restrictions as required
by the treaty. If the Fund were to renounce jurisdiction over
a particular class of restrictions, it would be giving up a por-
tion of its treaty-given oversight function. However, the
Fund, as an international economic organization, does not
have the capacity to judge the appropriateness of restric-
tions, discriminatory by definition and imposed for political
or strategic reasons.
28
Early in its history, the Fund confronted such a dilemma
when, in 1950, the United States imposed non-wartime sanc-
tions in the blocking and embargo actions taken against the
People's Republic of China and North Korea.2 9 The Fund's
response was that of a cunning civil servant who neither
wishes to meddle in his superior's political affairs nor to give
up one ounce of his own authority. In 1952, the Executive
Board promulgated a decision on Fund jurisdiction over pay-
ment restrictions imposed for security reasons.30 In Deci-
27. See supra text accompanying note 6.
28. For a discussion of the Fund's dilemma and national security re-
strictions on international payments, see R. EDWARDS, supra note 4. at 4 15-
20; Edwards, Exiraterritorial Application of the U S. Iranian Assets Control Regiu-
lations, 75 AM.J. INT'L L. 870 (1981) (a long analysis of article VIII, section
2(b) and the Iranian sanctions).
29. Malloy, supra note 2 1, at 24 n.49; R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 4 15
n.159; 2J. GOLD, THE FUND AGREEMENT IN THE COURTS 365-66 (1982).
30. E.B. Decision No. 144-(52/51) (Aug. 14, 1952), reprinted in St-
LECTED DECISIONS OF THE INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND AND SELECTED
DOCUMENTS 235 (10th issue 1983) [hereinafter SELECTED DECISIONS], and
in 2 J. GOLD, supra note 29, at 366-67.
The decision, which remains in effect as originally formulated. stipu-
Imaged with the Permission of N.Y.U. Journal of International Law and Politics
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sion No. 144, the Fund's Executive Board asserted the
Fund's jurisdiction over all restrictions on payments for cur-
rent transactions, but worked out a special procedure for re-
strictions "solely related to the preservation of national or
international security." 3'
The member country, if it in its discretion determines
that the reasons for the restrictions are so related, must
promptly notify the Fund. The notice is circulated immedi-
ately to the Executive Directors. If it is not satisfied that the
restrictions were "proposed solely to preserve such secur-
ity," the Fund must notify the member within 30 days of re-
ceiving notification. Otherwise, "the member may assume
that the Fund has no objection to the imposition of the re-
strictions."
32
SirJoseph Gold states that this assumption of"no objec-
tion" is equivalent to "approval," since there is "no middle
legal ground between approval and nonapproval under arti-
cle VIII, section 2(a)." 33 By providing for this procedure
under E.B. Decision No. 144-(52/51), the Fund does not
have to review the substance of the restrictions it accepts to
ensure that the), are being imposed solely for national or in-
ternational security reasons. Members are nonetheless
obliged to give extraterritorial effect to politically motivated
blockings if the affected contracts are exchange contracts.34
Nations imposing sanctions are aware of this Executive
Board Decision.35 In the imposition of the Iranian sanc-
tions,36 and presumably the Libyan sanctions, the United
lates that article VIII, section 2(a), applies to all restrictions on current
payments and transfers, irrespective of their motivation and tihe circun-
stances in which they are imposed because of the diflicult in distinguish-
ing cases involving restrictions imposed solely for security reasons and
those involving economic motivations.
31. E.B. Decision 144-(52/51), reprinted in SELECrED DEcIsio.cs. suplpa
note 30, at 235.
32. E.B. Decision 144-(52/51), repinted hi 2J. GOLD. sUpra note 29. .t
367.
33. 2 J. GOLD, supra note 29, at 368.
34. See supra text accompanying notes 12-16.
35. The Decision "has been invoked by more than 30 ineiberi ol tile
Fund that wcre imposing restrictions in conncCtion with ; vawiCtt of inter-
national situations." 2 J. GOLD, supra note 29. at 366.
36. Campbell, Allied Bank s Effect oni Internalional lending. .1 .Vnn-V S Pe-
.pective, 4 IrTI. FIN. L. REv. 28 (1985). Barry R. Campbell has snggesicd
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States notified the Fund of the imposition of the restrictions.
When the Fund had not notified the United States of objec-
tion after 30 days,37 the Iranian sanctions were deemed ap-
proved. 38 When Iran demanded repayment of its Eurodollar
deposits held at U.S. bank branches in London and Paris, the
private litigants cited this approval in the French and British
courts to argue that their contracts with the government of
Iran or its instrumentalities should not be enforced.
There has been a surprising lack of legal commentary on
this special procedure through which the Fund ends up sup-
porting extraterritorial effect for politically motivated restric-
tions on international payments.3 9 The Fund's desire not to
be a "forum for discussion of the political and military con-
siderations leading to [sanctions] .. ."40 is understandable.
Nevertheless, the Fund should rethink the special approval
procedure for national security restrictions. The imposition
of sanctions through blockage of the means of international
payments is exactly the sort of restriction on international
payments that the Fund should not approve.
A country's decision to impose sanctions is made on
strategic grounds,4 ' not on its need to conserve its foreign
that any efforts by commercial banks to have the Fund issue a Decision
adopting the narrow interpretation of "exchange contracts" or revising
the national security Decision may not receive the assistance of the U.S.
government. "When the U.S. attempted to obtain foreign recognition to
the freeze of Iranian assets, it relied on this provision [article VIII, section
2(b)] and may very well wish to preserve a similar argument for the fu-
ture." Id. at 29.
37. In the case of the Iranian sanctions, the Governor of the Central
Bank of Iran did, in fact, object to the U.S. measures. 2J. GOLD, supra note
29, at 367.
38. While the Fund "approved" the U.S. measures against Iran, it did
not approve Argentina's attempt to suspend transfers by foreign investors
during the Falkland Islands conflict. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4 at 417-18.
39. Exceptions include the treatment of Decision No. 144-(52/51) by
SirJoseph Gold, 2J. GOLD, supra note 29, at 368, and the full discussion by
Professor Edwards in his treatise, R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, and in his
article entitled "Extraterritorial Application of the U.S. Iranian Assets
Control Regulations." Edwards, supra note 28.
40. E.B. Decision No. 144-(52/51), reprinted in 2 J. GOLD, supra note 29,
at 366.
41. In the case of the Iranian restrictions, the United States Govern-
ment, or some officials thereof, claimed that a partial motivation for the
blockage was fear of the Iranian threat to suddenly withdraw its Eurodollar
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exchange as part of a particular economic restructuring or a
temporary balance of payments adjustment. As a result, the
blocking country interferes with current international pay-
ments for political reasons. If sanctioning restrictions are
imposed by a country in accordance with its U.N. Charter
obligations, 42 then the Fund should allow member countries
to impose restrictions on the making of payments and trans-
fers for international transactions. In other words, the pur-
pose of the economic treaty should yield to the greater
peacekeeping purpose of the Charter.43 Beyond such inter-
nationally approved sanctions, the Fund, as the guardian of
the free flow of payments throughout the global economic
system, should not provide what amounts to blanket ap-
proval of payments restrictions imposed for political rea-
sons. The Fund has never notified a country of its disap-
proval of the imposition of sanctions if the country has al-
leged national security reasons for the sanctions.
4"1
The Fund should continue to maintain jurisdiction over
all restrictions on payments for current transactions, but it
should recognize that "it is sometimes best to leave restric-
tions unapproved." 45 The Fund should discontinue its spe-
cial approval procedures for national security restrictions,
and not approve sanctions restricting international pay-
ments that are imposed strictly for political reasons. While
this approach may not deter governments who choose their
strategic considerations over their international obligations,
deposits in U.S. banks. See Lissakers, Money and Mfanipulation in Foreign Pol-
icy, cited in 2J. Gold, supra note 29, at 364 n.10, 365 n.13; W. CHRISTOIPHER.
supra note 21 (a discussion of this aspect of the hostage crisis): R. Et-
WARDS, supra note 4, at 419-20. The notifications sent to the Fund, how-
ever, did not cite these reasons, because the procedure in Decision No.
144 requires that the restrictions be imposed solely for reasons of national
or international security in order for the special approval procedure to
apply. If there are economic concerns for the government imposing the
restrictions, these concerns should be independently reviewed and ap-
praised by the Fund.
42. E.g., U.N. Charter art. 25. An example of such an obligation is re-
flected in the Security Council resolution imposing multilateral sanctions
on Rhodesia. S.C. Res. 217, 20 U.N. SCOR Res. and Dec. at 8-9. U.N.
Doc. S/INF/20/Rev. 1 (1965).
43. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 419.
44. See R. EDWARDS, supra note 4.
45. R. EDWARDS, supra note 4, at 419.
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the Fund will not be in the position of approving restrictions
which it ought to abhor.
46
If the monetary controls are not approved restrictions
under article VIII, section 2(a), then section 2(b) does not
apply. A court which is asked to enforce sanctions will then
look to private international law to determine their extrater-
ritorial effect. In essence, the court will apply its domestic
law, including private international law rules, act of state
doctrine and/or comity rules, and any other principles con-
cerning the recognition and enforcement of foreign public
law.
In the case of restrictions on international financial flows
for political reasons, the Author believes this would be a bet-
ter procedure. Article VIII, section 2(b) is supposed to aid
countries that need to maintain temporary exchange control
regimes, 47 under the Fund's watchful eye. Article VIII, sec-
tion 2(b) of the Fund Agreement clearly should not be ap-
plied to payments restrictions used as political weapons.
46. For a full exposition of the dangers which political restrictions on
the flow of international payments pose to the international financial sys-
tem, see Logan & Lichtenstein, supra note 1.
47. See supra text accompanying note 6.
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